It is questionable whether the ability to leave international treaties at will, thereby undermining the jurisdiction of international institutions such as courts over certain States at will, is a mistake rather than a feature of a consent-based legal system. Admittedly, institutions can be designed in such a way that withdrawal is more difficult, lasts longer or can only take place under certain conditions. This is true, of course, but these design features increase the cost of States accepting treaties in the first place, thereby reducing the likelihood of accession. The increase in exit costs only shifts the issue of consent to another level. Whatever stage consent is given, it makes the relationship between legal subjects (in this case, States) and the legal institutions that ensure that the values of the rule of law are respected fragile and unstable. The notion of anarchy so horrified the conservative Reagan that he spoke out against Briggs, and he was defeated. However, serious violations of the rule of law within communities may require external intervention. In a resolutely pluralistic archipelago, individuals and communities will have different ideals of legal and political justice; Only negotiated, publicly defensible norms that protect the freedom and equality of all members can serve as the foundation of legal justice. But unless these standards are supported by specialized legal institutions willing to interpret them, identify violations and impose remedies on victims, individuals and communities are not protected from the serious harm done to them. The more permanent and permanent authority legal institutions acquire supported by coercive power, the less they remain in the realm of overlapping horizontal competences and the more they resemble the institutions of the modern state.
The average person is willing to pull out their gun and look for trouble when their neighbor is robbed. A similar enthusiasm for the problems of a dirty bookstore seems unlikely, as the dirty bookstore does not threaten a specific person like a burglar next door threatens someone. If you`re away from the dirty bookstore, you probably don`t care. If you`re right next to the dirty bookstore, then you still don`t care how you deal with robbery, murder, and rape, and besides, the owner and some of the regular customers are real people to you, and you don`t want to make them unhappy. Today, the state does X, so we cannot have anarchy, because in anarchy no one would do X. Nozick suggests that in an anarchic society, the only way to have laws, consistent rules between people protected by one defense agency and people protected by another, is for one agency to impose its rules on the other by fire and steel. Some anarchist legal theorists argue that an ideal anarchist society should be based strictly on natural law and mutual aid, which do not require a social contract. [5] 30. Companies can legislate by banning certain behaviors outright or by varying prices: the more risk you behave, the higher the premium. The consequence of private company legislation is that people who are prone to violent behaviour pay higher premiums or are denied service altogether. Insurance companies are already doing this.
For travel insurance, you pay more if the trip involves riskier activities such as skiing or paragliding. For home insurance, you pay more if you have a home than if you don`t. Realists, while acknowledging the implications of the discourse on state action, responded that such thinking gives too much power to words. They argue that the dominant medieval communal discourse actually had little practical influence on the actual rival and belligerent actions of medieval states within their anarchic state system. Moreover, the initiators of constructivism were primarily American academics writing in the 1990s, before the attacks of September 11, 2001, in a world dominated by the United States and in a society that (exceptionally in history) had little experience of what it was like to be violently and decisively attacked by others from the outside. Only intellectuals entrenched in the security of the American world in the 1990s could have doubted the need for a state to create security against a hostile world without law or order. Offences that would cause a human being to use violence in response will be illegal. Crimes that would not cause most people to resort to violence in response will be legal. This consensual element of international criminal law means that representatives of States who do not agree with the rules of international criminal law or with the authority of the legal institutions interpreting those rules cannot be brought to justice, so that the victims of these very serious crimes do not have the opportunity to redress the injustice committed against them.
This is not entirely surprising: the rules of international criminal law generally hold officials responsible for serious crimes, but the competence of accountability institutions depends on the consent of some of the same persons on behalf of the country they represent. We can see this tension in the withdrawal of the Philippines and Burundi from the ICC, just as Burundi launched an investigation into President Duterte`s extrajudicial executions and investigated Burundian officials for crimes against humanity. Footnote 24 State officials may have other policy reasons for challenging the ICC`s authority. Footnote 25 However, a criminal justice system that relies almost entirely on state consent creates too many veto points that protect individuals and institutions capable of causing serious harm, exposing people around the world to threats to life and security, and offering few opportunities for redress. Footnote 26 This radical approach to individual liberty raises a range of questions about accessibility for people with limited economic resources, human well-being, the nature of the communities that may exist in this system, and the protection of rights.